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Participants: Commander A [attendee anonymized]  
Commander B [attendee anonymized]  
Attorney-Psychologist C [attendee anonymized]  
Psychiatrist D [attendee anonymized]  
Jean Maria Arrigo  
Ray Bennett  
Colleen Cordes  
Roberta Culbertson  
George Hunsinger  
David MacMichael  
Sam Provance  
Don Soeken  
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Cheryl Welsh

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Stephen Soldz: Shall we just get some summaries of the groups and discussions?

Jean Maria Arrigo: Don, would you introduce your guests, because not everyone got to meet them?

Don Soeken: This is Commander A and Commander B. They were former commanders, I guess, of two different units. I'm not sure what the name of your unit was.

Commander A: I served 24 years in the Army as a military intelligence officer. Most of my life was in the tactical intel and tactical realm.

Commander B: And I'm a strategic weenie. I was in [an overseas strategic unit]. I commanded [a company in that unit] back in the 80's, so my information is very dated.

Don Soeken: But historic. Should the whole room introduce themselves?

George Hunsinger: My name is George Hunsinger, I teach at Princeton Theological Seminary, and I founded the National Religious Campaign Against Torture, kind of a start-up organization.

Stephen Soldz: I'm Stephen Soldz, I'm a psychologist who's been very active in this issue and helped organize this with Jean Maria.

Jean Maria Arrigo: Jean Maria Arrigo, I'm a social psychologist.

Colleen Cordes: Colleen Cordes, and I'm executive director of Psychologists for Social Responsibility.

Ray Bennett: Ray Bennett, I served 25 years in the Army as a warrant officer, so I'm not a "real live officer" as you folks are, in the field of interrogation.

Sam Provance: My name is Samuel Provance, I was an intelligence analyst for the United States Army, and I was at Abu Ghraib for approximately five months during the timeline of the pictures, and spoke about the scandal and the investigation.

David MacMichael: I'm Dave MacMichael, [and] I wandered in off the street after a checkered career in the military, intelligence, and academia.

Don Soeken: I'm Don Soeken, and I was at one time a U.S. Public Health Service officer, and did most of my work in the Washington area, trying to keep the lid on the mental health of the people at St. Elizabeth. I've been working in the communal health center movement and I'm involved in this meeting, I think, because I've done a lot of work with whistleblowers in organizations.

Roberta Culbertson: I'm Roberta and I'm an anthropologist, and I've studied the long-term effects of violence, particularly mass violence and genocide.

Psychiatrist D: I'm a psychiatrist, and I work in a military setting.

Attorney-psychologist: Attorney and clinical psychologist.

Cheryl Welsh: My name is Cheryl Welsh, I'm with [mindjustice.org, a] human rights group which is concerned with the issue of neuroscience weapons, non-lethal weapons, and weapons that target the brain and nervous systems, new weapons.

Stephen Soldz: Should we get reports from the last round? Probably we should try and keep them fairly brief, on the three groups that just met.

David MacMichael: Can I address what we talked about, at least as I understood it? I was awake most of the time. I thought it was an outstanding presentation from both Commander A and Commander B, who had long and distinguished careers in military intelligence. At the tactical level, Commander A gave very succinct and pragmatic views of the manner in which the handling of prisoners and their interrogation is carried out and should be carried out at the level of a tactical unit. And I think, with much input from the group, he defined what he saw as the roles which psychologists, professional psychologists, could play in the military setting. Please correct me, [Commander A], if I'm straying too far, but I think you expressed a clear preference that these psychologists be in uniform and be in the chain of command in some fashion, and contractors should

not be involved operationally. As I understood it, your description of the three roles which psychologists might play here: 1) in the training of interrogators, 2) while interrogators are in action, the psychologists in uniform who are in the chain of command can observe and advise but not take part in the interrogation. They can further counsel and [continue] training for the interrogators on the basis of what they observe in their performance. Finally, and I thought most importantly, Commander A's suggestion as I interpret it here, was that the third role for uniformed psychologists is to be in the Inspector General chain, so that as observations, complaints and so forth, malfunctions if you will, come up in the system of handling prisoners and interrogating them, that these can be sent up the military inspector general chain, be considered at the highest command level, and then come back down through the operational military chain, and the necessary changes or modifications of interrogations could be carried out. I think that the one thing, again, this is my interpretation of what we discussed, is that contractors, contract psychologists, should not be engaged in the chain of command or in-the-field operations, because of the difficulty of control and confusion that could be put. I defer now to other participants who may have had a slightly different view of that, or have other things that they have to say.

Commander A: I would just say that it's important that if you put them down there, that in at least one of those roles they should be outside the normal combatant chain of command.

David MacMichael: Who do you mean by "they" in this case?

Commander A: Your psychologists. They should be able to provide a role similar to an IG, or through the IG mechanism, where if they see something wrong going on, they can go to the local commander and say, "I've seen this, and I recommend you get it fixed". And it can stop there, at the commander. Having been a company commander and battalion commander, you're responsible for everything, but you're not always aware of everything. And when you find out that something is amiss, it's your obligation and duty to go fix it. And if that means taking UCMJ action against a junior soldier or officer for violation of the UCMJ, then so be it. But if that officer in the chain of command ignores the warning, and just lets the misconduct continue, then that's the signal for that psychologist that's on the IG side to send the alert up the IG chain. And we kicked it around a little bit and we decided that leveraging the existing IG structure would probably be better than trying to invent another whole separate psychologist or clinical psychologist chain of command.

Colleen Cordes: I also recall also, tell me if I got this right, that if you are going to be an advisor or consultant to an interrogation, you would not also be part of this IG type command.

Commander A: Correct.

David MacMichael: Right. It's entirely outside the operational chain.

Commander A: It's very similar to how you set up the lawyers now: you're either on the defense side or the prosecutorial side, but you're not on both at the same time. There's two separate structures there.

Colleen Cordes: And then, Commander B, I thought I heard you say that you felt a little, you had some uncertainty about the idea of psychologists, you know, having been trained as health providers also--

Commander B: Yeah. Where I see psychologists helping, from a soldier perspective, is training interrogators on what psychology is all about, and how that can help in interrogations. To actually participate in an interrogation, to me personally, is over the line. And observation is helpful. One of the things we did bring out is that observation would be helpful from a psych--

David MacMichael: That would lead to improved training.

Commander B: To improve, and especially to also be evaluating the interrogator at the same time. When the interrogator himself has gotten too close to the subject, too emotional, too whatever, and be able to pull back.

Stephen Soldz: So just to clarify, you're saying the observation is really of the interrogator, and it's not to advise on interrogation, it's not to advise on how to get better information, but is to advise the interrogator-

Commander B: That's my opinion.

Stephen Soldz: Yes, I'm trying to get that. And were there other perspectives? I wasn't clear on the number 2), what they observing and advising for.

David MacMichael: Psychologists have been involved in the field manual take on how to train an interrogator. Psychologists have taken part in the training of interrogators at the command level, and for the observation, they're clearly going to say, "This guy is not following the training, making him ineffective" and so forth. And that's why you keep two docs.

George Hunsinger: Are you suggesting that the observer should be in the interrogation room?

David MacMichael: No.

George Hunsinger: So what does "observation" mean? How does it take place?

Colleen Cordes: You who have been involved in interrogations, we did not take that question up carefully, can this be...is it a booth? A one-way window you can look in? Is this a televised deal, or what?

Sam Provance: Right. They ended up constructing an interrogation booth where you had several booths on each side and in the middle you had like an observation space that they could look through the mirror. Somebody couldn't see you, but you could see them. It wasn't used, but it was there.

George Hunsinger: Is there any reason why the observer would have to be a psychologist?

David MacMichael: No. There's no reason why anybody has to be there, but the psychologist - [all talking]

George Hunsinger: This is a serious question. What is it about a psychologist that qualifies a psychologist to be an observer in this situation?

Commander A: Because he has trained.

George Hunsinger: That's not a sufficient answer.

David MacMichael: He is, as we all are in any sort of an operational situation, we monitor, and we say "Is the interrogator following the training instructions that he or she has had?"

George Hunsinger: I'm not clear why the monitor should be a psychologist.

Stephen Soldz: As opposed to a veteran interrogator, who presumably is doing most of the training.

David MacMichael: Arguably, that would be the case. We were exploring roles for psychologists.

Stephen Soldz: I was trying to figure out if there was any unique role, any unique value added for it being a psychologist, as opposed to a veteran interrogator, because presumably the bulk of the interrogation training is going to be done by interrogators. Psychologists could be part of it, but--

David MacMichael: Just to clarify the statement: I think the agreement among the group discussing it was that psychologists should not be interrogators. They should be trainers of, observers of, advisors of interrogators, and that's it.

Commander B: David, I'm not sure we had an agreement.

Commander A: I was getting ready to say. I think that if you look at the mission, what's the mission of one of those settings? That's to get the intelligence out as quickly as possible, as humanely as possible, okay? And if the addition of a psychologist teamed with an interrogator would make that happen, understanding that you also have a psychologist on the other side, on the IG side, as the brakes against anything, as the

boundary, then you satisfy the mission. You're extracting the information, you're doing it quickly, you're doing it humanely, the interrogator is a high performance interrogator because he's got some help from a psychologist who can help read the detainee better, say "Well, you're kind of being non-productive there, you might go this way". As a military commander, I would see that that is all a valid use of a psychologist in that setting. Now, as psychologists you might not like that, but I'm saying that as commander, if that improves my mission, then I would like to see that. But on the other side, psychologists on the IG side helps put the brakes into the system.

David MacMichael: I fail to see where there's any complete disagreement on it. If, and I think this is one of the things that you expressed, Commander A, if you were a psychologist floating around your battalion headquarters or whatever, the idea of having a psychologist in an observation role may absolutely be unnecessary, and the training and IG role would be all that would be required. So that's 66 and two-thirds percent right there.

Colleen Cordes: We also talked a little bit about the roles of chaplains.

David MacMichael: Well, they're not psychologists.

Colleen Cordes: No, but that was the whole point, is that this IG type role, perhaps chaplains--

Sam Provance: They're not psychologists, but a lot of them have studied psychology, if not all of them. I haven't met one that hasn't. And they do kind of serve as a psychologist when they counsel soldiers. I'm just saying that what's the Army, when proposed with this psychologist business, the Army would say "Well, chaplains already fulfill this role, or they could fulfill this role."

Stephen Soldz: So what you're suggesting is that there's a monitoring role which you think should be in the IG chain of command, which psychologists might be appropriate for. That would need to be thought about more precisely. They might be, there might be others. Is that sort of a fair summary of that part of it?

Don Soeken: The rest of it is I asked "suppose I came to him and said that there's something going on down at the cell block or whatever, that is unethical and shouldn't be going on."

David MacMichael: By "to him" you mean the commander?

Don Soeken: Yeah, to the commander, and he said that if he was in his chain of command he would do this.

Commander A: Well, it depends on the type of commander you're dealing with. If you're dealing with a commander who's sort of focused on the mission, he might say "sit down and shut up". But if he was in the IG role, and I knew in advance that he's in an IG

role, and I know he's got a separate chain of command and communications infrastructure going back up that I can't control, I'm more likely to say "Don, I hear you, I'm going to go check it out."

Don Soeken: And that is a good space for a whistleblower to be in. Because if you can't be touched by this man, I mean in the real world you might be, but that could be an answer to how to deal with the whistleblowing, because you're in a different group. And that group can also come down with the force of the law on the other side.

Commander A: I don't know.

Don Soeken: It seemed good at one point, that "Oh my God, I can actually be protected".

Commander A: I mean, the reason that IG's are around is, they're the observers, they watch the chain of command, and they see, like a colonel or general, and say "Sir, I know you want to use that vehicle for that personal visit, but that's a violation of the law". And it's just a reminder to the commander, because they get caught up in all kinds of high speed activities, and it's easy for them to turn to an aide or turn to somebody and say "Schedule a vehicle", without thinking about the implications. And so that's why you have those IG's down there, to... I don't know how long, they've been there for...as long as the Army's been in existence, I think, there's always been some kind of--

Colleen Cordes: And then, Sam, did you say that there was an IG at Abu Ghraib, but that-

Sam Provance: I didn't know of any IG at Abu Ghraib. Not that it would have really made a difference.

David MacMichael: You never saw one.

Sam Provance: My experience with the IG was you go to the IG, and then he contacts the battalion commander, and says "you have a problem, you need to do a criminal investigation", and then the battalion commander appoints one of his staff officers as an investigating officer, who probably doesn't care, or knows the people involved, or knows what they're doing, who knows? But then he or she reports back to him or her with their findings, and then he decides based on those statements what those findings are, and then reports back to the IG. But he's really at liberty to shape the findings, or his decision how ever-

Commander A: Yeah, I had soldiers go to the IG on me, and one of the first things the IG will say is "Have you given the chain of command an opportunity to fix the problem?" And if they haven't, the IG is just going to turn them around and send them back, but the IG always goes to the commander and says, "You should be aware that this soldier appears to have a problem going on. It doesn't appear that he's gone to [his chain of command], maybe he's afraid of his chain of command, he hasn't gone to them. You might want to check into it". And then I've had things go to the IG that I ended up court-

martialing a soldier over. So it all depends. Soldiers being soldiers, some of them will whine and they'll go to the IG once a week. I've had them write their congressman. I had one that would get his mother to write his congressman. And I finally had to wave a letter in front of the formation, I said "If you're going to write your congressman, write it yourself. And this one has all kinds of grammatical errors in it. If you need help, I'll be glad to do the grammatical checking before it goes up. And maybe in the process, we can figure out what is wrong, and fix it." So not every complaint that comes up from the bottom to the IG is legitimate. You end up sifting through them and figuring out--

David MacMichael: And even where they are legitimate, in every agency of government, the rules are that you must exhaust the administrative remedies within your organization before you go outside, otherwise they can't take care of it.

Stephen Soldz: Okay, why don't we move on to the next group.

Attorney-Psychologist: Can I just ask a question? Because in terms of our discussion, um, Commander A, you said that as a commander, "I would want a psychologist if the psychologist could help me accomplish the mission". You framed it in such a way that you [have to ask] "Will this individual with this training help me achieve that goal?" You, Commander B, said "Yes, but I don't like the idea of a psychologist in that role". And then you, David, seemed to say "the fewer psychologists, the better all around." But I guess what I'm asking is, in terms of reasons, because one reason is "well, it's an empirical question: can psychologists help attain the mission" and then that should be just posited. Is that what the group thinks should be the criteria? Are there other criteria?

David MacMichael: Again, for myself, I'm in some agreement with the others. The most defensible roles that I see, and according to what you said, "does it help achieve the mission?", and I'll just add a phrase "does it help achieve the mission within the limits of existing doctrine and law?". So we see the roles, as I think we've discussed, for psychologists, in training interrogators, giving them sufficient knowledge of the psychological elements of interrogation. The role I think we all agree on, also was to have competent psychologists in the inspector general chain that could handle questions about this. One I don't think we were in complete agreement on was an additional role for the psychologists assigned at the command level to observe, and on the basis of observation, further train and improve the performance of the interrogators. But it's all connected, in regard to your basic question: Yes, it is all connected with the achievement of the objective in the most efficient, rapid manner, and, again to emphasize this point, is in accordance with law and doctrine.

Attorney-Psychologist: So in that context, efficient in keeping with law and doctrine, that it seems that the criteria that the group has focused on is: "Does the presence of the psychologist help achieve the goal?" And that that should be the touchstone. Is that right?

Colleen Cordes: I don't think the group really spoke about that. I think David is putting together sort of different points that were made and making a very valid thesis statement



there. I can't really say that the group focused in on that particular. That was my impression, is that we didn't really take up what should be criteria--

David MacMichael: The question was not put: "Is this the basic criterion?" If it had been, I would have said yes.

Stephen Soldz: There's a whole other set of criteria that you hinted at, which had to do with what psychologists want to do and psychological ethics, which is not what you're really considering. So there would have to be another side of the discussion, as we have.

Commander A: There was a little bit of friction, because I detected that there was more politics in this than science, but remember: this time it happened under Republican administration, Abu Ghraib. Next time the commander in chief sends soldiers downrange, it may be a Democratic president, and you're going to want the infrastructure in place to support the needs of the nation. So the mission...you always have to put it in the context of the mission. What's the mission? The mission is to do what the commander in chief asks of the military, but do it quickly and humanely.

David MacMichael: War is the continuation of politics by another means.

Commander A: And so regardless of whether you agree or disagree with this administration right now, this is not a "bash Bush" event, I hope. I hope that the purpose is to put the infrastructure in place so that any president, all future presidents, would have the infrastructure and guards in place to be able to achieve the mission, extract the information from detainees, prisoners of war, whatever you want to call them, whether they're uniformed or not uniformed, do it humanely and achieve the mission.

Jean Maria Arrigo: The president, whoever he is, is the commander in chief of the military. But he isn't the commander in chief of any of the professions, so the professions have their own ethical code. And we are more united with psychologists around the world. Psychologists are not a national interest, so our ethics have to be different from whatever comes down from the commander in chief, and even different from military ethics, even if we agree with the commander in chief. So it's different for military ethics. And so there's this natural tension between the military psychologists and I think we haven't been able to-- That's a very hard thing to resolve, which has empirical elements, and spiritual elements, and so on. So we really have not resolved that.

Stephen Soldz: There's places of direct intersection of interests and thinking that places us into this conflict.

Attorney-Psychologist: I think that one of the things that would be very helpful, I don't know how much effort the group will be able to put into this, but as you outlined, you talked about three separate roles for psychologists, and then some other people said, "Well, we'd be comfortable with 1 and 2, but maybe not so much with 3", is to set out the reasons based on ethics that would distinguish those roles that you would think are acceptable from the roles you don't. So what is the ethically relevant reasons why 1 and 2

you would view as permissible, and number 3 you would not. So that's clear from the beginning.

Stephen Soldz: Some of this will occur in a later stage of the project, where we'll lay out some case and solicit probably multiple ethical commentaries on them that will help deal with some of these issues. So we're not trying, this weekend, to resolve everything, but more to lay out the different types of cases.

George Hunsinger: Can I just go back to a point I laid out this morning? It's not necessarily only an ethical question. There are questions of competency and training that would come to bear when we're thinking about who is appropriate to fit into the role of an observer. Is the psychologist really the best qualified person by training to be in that role? That's not an ethical question.

Commander A: And I would posit a question: there are always going to be interrogations, regardless of what this group wants to believe. So as a community, do you want to be part of the process to ensure that it's done correctly, or are you going to stand on the outside and throw stones at it? So you either participate in it in a very productive process, or you're on the outside, and interrogations will take place in any which way that a commander decides they should take place.

Ray Bennett: Commander A, when did you retire?

Commander A: [Late 1990's].

Ray Bennett: Okay, perfect. What was your interrogation experience?

Commander A: The first Gulf War. I was a division G-2, I had interrogators, translators, working for me, but it was all very quick tactical screening, and then we moved them--

Ray Bennett: Did you have any psychologists working at the interrogation level back then? And, my second question is, did you have a need for an observer function back then?

Commander A: No, because it was so fast, we literally collected them up, had the doctor go through them, check them out, we gave them food and gave them water, and we told them to keep walking south along the tank tracks, and we moved north. The division trains had the mission to pick them up.

Ray Bennett: Okay. Thank you.

Stephen Soldz: Okay, can we move on to another group?

Attorney-Psychologist: Yes. In my group was Jean Maria, and Psychiatrist D and myself, and we had a conference call in the middle of it. Jean Maria started us off by quoting Jonathan Marks, and [Colleen], you had quoted this, I think, this morning as well, that

our goal is to make the high road not as steep and the low road not as attractive. And then Jean Maria quoted you, Ray, about the least intrusive means to extract the information, and then Psychiatrist D really focused us on the value of evidence and working forward from an evidence base.

And then we talked about various types of studies that one might do, and we discussed the notion of developing whatever role is defined for the psychologist into its own competence. And we posed the question: what would go into that competence? And we thought that having it defined as a separate competence might address a number of concerns. Then we talked about different chains of command for the psychologists in observing, it sounds like that discussion was a parallel to the discussion that you all heard.

Psychiatrist D talked about an ethics course in her program, and at that point we had the conference call with [Mr. E, a military contractor], and [the company he works for has] a simulation program that they run with the military, and it sounds like a hugely sophisticated program that they run, with multiple actors in multiple locations that simulate battlefield conditions. But then there is a whole other part to it, this is the BCTP, I guess run out of Fort Leavenworth, the Battle Command Training Program, and there is an aspect to it called PMESCI, and the acronym is for the Political, Military, Economic, Social, and Cultural Infrastructure. So it takes a look at battlefield, broadly defined, and then a number of different dimensions, so that there's both simulation in terms of the actual battle conditions, but then there are other aspects of the training that look at a variety of other conditions and dimensions of the conflict. And really, we were on the phone for about 45 minutes with [Mr. E], talking about various aspects, and how that might fit in with the project of this group, or how it might be adapted.

Jean Maria Arrigo: Then Roberta came in, and we were considering how you might have a low-budget version of this, using psychodynamics or role-playing, things that social scientists are more adjusted to. And then we also, sort of...in my imagination availed ourselves of the good will of the various interrogators, who are standing up against torture interrogation, thinking that they might possibly participate in something like this.

Stephen Soldz: We've done some of this in mental health. We had training programs with therapists, with actors who simulated patients, things of that nature.

Psychiatrist D: We do that a lot. We do a lot of training of cases, but what we do is, we select a topic, and then have cases in a series, so that one is kind of open and shut, and they get more complex and interesting as you go along, for people to take some decision about where is the line, and did you cross it? Because a lot of these things are not bright lines. They're heavily contextualized, and there are always some small aspect that changes the dynamic that has to be considered. And we'll just sit around and table-talk, and work through the case in which it becomes more and more complicated and it's easier to fall off the straight and narrow. So I think that might be a way to go. [Inaudible text] ...determining what the ethical parameters are, and I'd suggested that could be done using the research methodology, in asking your colleagues where they think the line is crossed, in developing a training manual from the opinions of the colleagues who, not only those actually involved, but those surrounding them.

Jean Maria Arrigo: I was very humbled as a psychologist hearing the extent of their training.... Anyway, I got a feeling that this may explain partly to us why the psychiatrists haven't been pushed around as much as the way the psychologists have been. And I think that's a lesson that we should listen to.

Stephen Soldz: And probably the rest of the psychiatric profession outside of the military should listen these days, as well. I was talking over lunch about it, I was awed by the program that they have, and how far we've come down in my short career, in the quality of training in mental health. We had a very interesting discussion, but we didn't come to definite conclusions. What we were trying to think about was the framework from this morning that George had presented from Rejali's work on the five things needed to prevent torture, And trying to think about how one would institutionalize them. Just to remind, the five were: "having a clear chain of command", and this actually might, could potentially conflict with some of the ideas about having multiple chains of command. I don't know where that plays in.

Commander A: The IG is a specific chain of command, but it's a parallel chain of command to the operational chain of command.

Stephen Soldz: Yeah, I understand for the IG's. I wasn't completely correct, but we don't need to get into it now, that if there were psychologists or any observers, whoever these were, was out there, where they would be in the chain of command.

David MacMichael: They would be right in the battalion chain of command.

Stephen Soldz: Okay, so anyway for that one. "A uniform standard of interrogation". And we agree that as long as there are enhanced interrogations for some people, there would others who would think that whatever case they had was a candidate for enhanced interrogation, regardless of whatever the rules were. "A quick, immediate grievance procedure and adjudication for prisoners with grievances". "Real monitoring", which you folks also addressed in the form of the IG, potentially, and we had some other ideas, and "accountability". We discussed some different models.

David MacMichael: I think to clarify this, and please, Commander A and Commander B correct me if I'm wrong, the IG was not involved in monitoring. The IG was part of the complaint process, and moving that into the battalion command. Is that your understanding of the framework?

Commander B: [Yes.]

Stephen Soldz: So after a while, we realized we were trying to get too deep, and Roberta helped with this, her reflections, and we were trying to get too detailed before we sort of dealt with the more general issues. So we had some discussion of details of some possible accountability structures, and possible monitoring structures, but then we decided that we were getting too detailed, and there are people who've devoted lots of effort to thinking

about these and what's critical is that we agree with Rejali, these are important elements if one wants to ever end torture. For example, we talked about, as monitoring, [possible] videotaping of not tactical interrogations, but ones in set facilities. That videotaping could be routine, as is used for example increasingly in police interrogations. But then we sort of decided that we were going too detailed there.

Commander A: That's a valid point. I work in computer security right now. We keep audit logs for five years. There's a reason we keep them for five years, and that is if you end up with a bad administrator, you can still many years later go finger the administrator that went bad on you. So if you wrote into doctrine that every interrogation that's done at a facility, not at the tactical level, but at a facility is videotaped, and it must be archived, and made available for five years, I mean, you pair that with the IG--

Stephen Soldz: And also, we felt that it was very important to have clear rules on confidentiality. Videotaping has negative effects, [for example] being afraid of how people are going to look, and you need clear rules about who can and can't access it, and in what conditions. If there was a commitment to not have abuses, then that could clearly be an element of setting up such a system.

Commander A: There was one other thing we discussed in ours, and that was doctrine. The military is a doctrinal force, and doctrine probably needs to be extended to deal with un-uniformed detainees in a more deliberate manner. I mean, it may be tangentially covered in the [Field Manuals] and [Technical Manuals], but they need to make it more overt, and if you set up a psychologist in the IG chain of command, that doctrine has got to be there about how he behaves, how he's trained, what his role is, and so on. Any adjustments you make to the military, you have to start with doctrine.

Psychiatrist D: The problem is, of course, is that only the Army has doctrine, and the other forces [inaudible]

George Hunsinger: But we have to take the intelligence service into account here, not just the military.

Colleen Cordes: Well, the other thing, you just reminded me about this, what you said about the doctrine, that we talked about, I don't know if everyone agreed to this, but certainly Commander A and Commander B suggested that they would imagine the doctrine would include treating un-uniformed combatants as least as well or the same as you would treat uniformed combatants in terms of holding them, treating them in accordance with the Geneva Conventions.

Commander A: I was surprised to find out that there were women and children at Abu Ghraib, that they brought in families. There's no doctrine that I'm aware to guide soldiers on how to handle that. That's why I say that doctrine probably needs to be investigated. The problem is, you need some kind of doctrine, training, and guidance on how to deal with it. If they're safer than out on the streets, where somebody else could walk up to the house and blow them all away, then you have an obligation--

Ray Bennett: Was that why they were there, Sam? Were they in some kind of protective custody, that's why they were there?

Sam Provance: That's the reason I was given. But, as in the case I found out later, and MP's corroborated this, they were using family members to get detainees to cooperate, as part of the interrogation premises.

George Hunsinger: That's a clear violation of the Geneva Conventions.

David MacMichael: But I also know that due to the methods of detention used, that families very frequently had no idea where their family members, their husbands, their brothers, and so forth were. And being the kind of society they are, they checked around, "Oh, they took them to Abu Ghraib", and they went there, just as I would go to jail when my kids are locked up, and attempt to secure their release.

Colleen Cordes: But then it would be different if you were not allowed to leave and come back and forth at your own--

Sam Provance: We had families come every day, you know, weeping and wailing, to find out if whoever was in there was alive or dead, or when are they coming out.

Stephen Soldz: But it wasn't until the summer of 2004, considerably after the scandal broke, that they came up with a list of who was detained there and was placed on the web.

Don Soeken: One of the problems that I've had is that...you just said something, "weeping and wailing", looking for their families?

Sam Provance: Right.

Roberta Culbertson: It would seem like there's a perception that some people have, and I have, is that it can't be that bad.

[Attorney-Psychologist leaves the group at this point.]

David MacMichael: But it's almost universal. For whatever set of reasons, you take people away and arrest them--

Don Soeken: I would see the families and talk to them, try to work out their problems.

Sam Provance: I just had no clue what was going on. And the guard at the gate, he's not going to make phone calls and get answers. He's just going to make sure that they don't cause any trouble.

Colleen Cordes: There's also a long history of Abu Ghraib, long before we got there, so that's a whole--

Stephen Soldz: But I consider the fact that they didn't keep a log as just one of the--

Sam Provance: Well, I mean it's not like we had supplies, or enough... [For example,] I was chewed out by my company commander for not having, in writing, my soldier's monthly counselings. And [I thought] "we don't even have a printer yet, or the software for me to print the form", so you've got to think of things operationally here. We're in the middle of chaos, and we're doing what we can, and all this "checking the box" stuff, you can't do it. At Abu Ghraib, we didn't have the luxury of the garrison.

Commander A: I did all my counseling forms longhand. There was a pre-printed form, I had it in my desk drawer, piled up a ream at a time, and I pulled them out and hand-wrote them.

Sam Provance: I mean, my commander probably had the same thing, that's probably why he was upset with me, that I didn't have the same forethought.

Ray Bennett: I've never seen counseling forms on a [battle] packing list.

Sam Provance: But there was hardly enough portajohns for us, let alone the prisoners. There was not enough food for us, let alone the prisoners. If you want to know a lot of the details, when things were being set up, especially from a command level, General Karpinski, General Fast, General Sanchez, all their sworn statements are available to the public, I know [that they're] at the ACLU website, where they detail why they did this or why they didn't do that, what the circumstances were as far the command level.

Commander A: Well, when we're comparing and contrasting the first Gulf War with this one, I dealt with uniformed adversaries, and the doctrine was very clear on how we handle it. And we had it all set up, the process, we even brought concertina wire with us, and tents, so we could build the temporary POW compound, and cots and all that. We came prepared to deal with it in the field.

Stephen Soldz: Well, part of the fantasy [concerning the 2003 invasion of Iraq] was being greeted with flowers, so that the preparations for the aftermath were not made until the shit hit the fan. They were having to make it up.

Commander A: It's easy for all of us to be an armchair quarterback, and look back and say "well, they should have done this and they should have done that".

Ray Bennett: Well, it's helpful in the sense that we're trying to say "okay, how are we going to fix it for the next time?"

Commander A: When you're trying to move hundreds of thousands of soldiers, and literally millions of tons of hardware and equipment into theater to make it all happen, it's

incredibly complex, and the more complex operations are, the more likely they are to break down. War is foggy. It never goes perfect.

David MacMichael: Well, look, Commander A, I think you made this point and you made it well, the focus here, regardless of whether you've got the forms with you or anything else, is when you get down to the point of interrogation of a person in your custody, there are rules for the way in which this is to be conducted. At one side of this, what I think this group is considering, is in the conduct of these interrogations, what is the appropriate role for a trained psychologist to play, whether in uniform or out? I think, thanks to your help, we were able to pretty well focus in on that.

Stephen Soldz: I think we're about done for this evening. I want to thank you so much.

Commander A: When Don told me about [the group meeting to discuss this topic], I said, "I want to contribute, and I want to contribute to the solution."

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Final authorization on